Sensitivity of stability indices to dealerting

Abstract

It is reported that more than 100 former or current heads of state and civilian leaders from around the world, including ex-presidents Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev, have signed a statement that calls for removing nuclear weapons from alert status and other measures aimed at the eventual elimination of atomic arsenals--reflecting mounting support for the cause of nuclear bolition. This note uses stability analysis derived from current US and Russian analyses to study the impact of such dealerting on stability, indicating that it could be negative. Dealerting forces removes them from first and second strikes for as long as they are dealerted. If they are dealerted for periods long compared to those involved in the evaluation of first strike stability, dealerting has the same effect as permanent arms reductions, it subtracts them from first and second strikes. Thus, it is conceptually a way of implementing such reductions on an accelerated scale. Dealerting strategic forces has been posited as a stabilizing step towards their abolition. Previous reports have shown that planned START reductions will reduce stability indices by about a factor of two. Dealerting would hasten those reductions. They would also raise the possibility that one side could realert faster thanmore » the other. If so, the remobilized forces could be used to damage limit, which would reduce his first strike cost and stability index. The impact of complete demobilization of SSBNs would be an order of magnitude reduction in the overall stability index, to a level set by alert ICBMs. Generally, it would be preferable to maintain any existing strategic forces at the highest level of alert to minimize this effect and to concentrate instead on decreasing their total number.« less