Sensitive Detection of GPS Spoofing Attack in Phasor Measurement Units via Quasi-Dynamic State Estimation

Jiahao Xie,A.P Sakis Meliopoulos

doi:10.1109/mc.2020.2976943

Sensitive Detection of GPS Spoofing Attack in Phasor Measurement Units via Quasi-Dynamic State Estimation

Jiahao Xie, A.P Sakis Meliopoulos

https://doi.org/10.1109/mc.2020.2976943

Copy DOI

Journal: IEEE Computer	Publication Date: May 1, 2020
Citations: 11

Affiliation: Georgia Institute of Technology

#GPS Spoofing Attacks #Robust Performance + Show 5 more

Abstract
Full-Text PDF
Similar Papers

Abstract

We propose the use of a quasi-dynamic-state estimator to detect GPS spoofing attacks and assist in recovering from attacks on power grids. Numerical results show that this method is sensitive to GPS spoofing attacks with robust performance regardless of measurement noise.

Full Text