Sensibility and Transcendence in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics

Abstract

In Sein and Zeit (= SZ), Heidegger mentions only very briefly connection with his project of a fundamental ontology. In fact, with exception of his critical discussion of Cartesian account of senses, Heidegger offers only a single, laconic sentence which he explicitly brings together status of and of human existence.' Consequently, apparent paucity SZ of any detailed thematic elaboration concerning significance of what may broadly be termed the has led many to claim that this aspect of human existence is ignored by Heidegger. And yet, Kant and das Problem der Metaphysik (= KPM), a work immediately following Sein and Zeit and very much concerned with same fundamental questions as earlier work, problematic surrounding what could be called an ontology of sensibility occupies a position that is far from being merely tangential. We find instead that reflections on nature of very much inform core of problematic pursued throughout KPM. In Heidegger's retrieval of Kant, bodily nature of human existence, which this book falls under rubric of sensibility, is neither ignored nor eliminated from of Dasein.2 Heidegger understands Kant's project Kritik der reinen Vernunft (= KrV) to be ultimately an one: it is an inquiry into essence and possibility of transcendence and knowledge.' In sense used by Heidegger, transcendence names fact that entities are given to human existence not as they are in themselves, but rather always terms of their beingness. Heidegger demonstrates his interpretation of Kant that is essential to possibility of transcendence insofar as forms site of correspondence or conjunction of essence (ontological structure) of finite knower and essence (ontological structure) of entities. In other words, understood its (rather than merely empirical) significance is both a condition for possibility of our finite access to entities as well as a condition for possibility of entities themselves appearing their beingness. In language of SZ site which encountering of entities becomes possible is called world (SZ 65ff.). And insofar as forms this correspondence which entities are encounterable, we can say a specific sense that is world. The presentation of will be carried out two steps: after some brief preliminary comments I will situate within grounding of metaphysics. I will show this section that meaning of resides finitude's full import for question of transcendence. I will then establish that is a necessary element structure of transcendence, and I will show how ontological forms site of correspondence for structure of knower and structure of known. Preliminary Comments A few preliminary comments are order regarding both what Heidegger is up to KPM as well as what my thesis entails vis-a-vis Kant's critical philosophy. To begin with, position Heidegger puts forth KPM should by no means be understood as a faithful account of what Kant's own position is. Although Heidegger is writing on Kant, Kantian philosophy is more of an occasion for development of Heidegger's own thinking than an exegetical goal of his text. Because Heidegger is more concerned with problem of metaphysics (KPM 301f.) than he is with what Kant explicitly understood of this problem, he does not try simply to Kant right. On this point Heidegger is very clear: not only does he say that he will not follow Kant's own paths of thinking-he prefers instead to expose original impetus (KPM 70/47) driving problematic and to get at unsaid set before our eyes Kant's explicit formulation (KPM 201/137)-but he also freely concedes violence of his interpretation relation to Kant's expressed philosophy (KPM Preface to Second Edition, 202/138, 302). …