Abstract
This paper is a study of the problem of illusion in sense perception, using the methods of critical exposition and content analysis as tools of engagement. For decades, post-modern epistemology was steeped in the murky waters of the brilliant, skeptic argument from illusion, according to which the senses could not be relied upon for knowledge of the external world of reality, due to problems believed to be inherent in sensory perception. Why was the argument from illusion so important to epistemologists as to elicit enormous interest for such a long time? What are the implications of the argument for science? Did the argument from illusion portend any real danger for the foundations of empirical knowledge claims, as supposed by many frontline epistemologists? Exploring the concept and science of perceptual illusion, and the implications of the argument from illusion for science and epistemology, the paper found that the argument failed as a refutation of direct realism because it views illusion as the norm rather than an exception, and portrays human knowing process as an automatic, rather than a procedural, gradual phenomenon.Keywords: argument from illusion, empiricism, epistemology, science, skepticism
Highlights
This paper is a critical exposition and examination of the problem of illusion in sense experience, or sensory perception. This problem is traditionally posed as challenge to commonsense realism, the belief that objects of experience are directly or immediately accessible to the senses in perception
This belief formed the basis of the submission of 17th century empiricism that the senses, prior to and independent of reason, are the valid means of acquiring knowledge and truth about objective reality (Hamlyn, 1967)
This paper subjected the sceptical position to a critical analysis and found that it is invalidated by two factors: the first is that illusions are not the norm, but only the exception, in human perception; and the second is that human knowledge is a gradual and procedural phenomenon, rather than an instant, magical attainment of perfect comprehension of reality
Summary
This paper is a critical exposition and examination of the problem of illusion in sense experience, or sensory perception. On this sense datum theory of perception, the question arises: “given that we are only acquainted with sense data in perception, how could perception justify beliefs about external objects?” (Speaks, 2004:5) So, if we believe in these sense-data, they will be things we can know about in every case of perception, regardless of how favourable the external conditions of perception are, or are known to be This gives us the following summarised proposal: If you perceive x as F, and you have reason to believe that the perceptual conditions are currently ‘normal’ or favourable, and x is really F, only are you in a position to know that x is F (Pryor, 2002:par.). This theory has been criticised as being too general to explain the specific effects obtained in most cases of illusion, such as Herring’s illusion, whereby two horizontal and perpendicular lines appear curved to an onlooker
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