Abstract
Recent research in moral psychology has highlighted how the current internal states of observers can influence their moral judgments of others’ actions. In this article, we argue that an important internal state that serves such a function is the sense of control one has over one’s own actions. Across four studies, we show that an individual’s own current sense of control is positively associated with the intensity of moral judgments of the actions of others. We also show that this effect extends not only to judgments of rightness and wrongness (Study 1), but also to assignments of reward and punishment (Study 2). Finally, we demonstrate that this effect is based on the current experience of control by showing a moderation of the effect via motivational states (promotion; prevention) that either lead one to incorporate or disregard internal states when making judgments (Study 3) and by subtly manipulating participants’ sense of control (Study 4).
Highlights
Perceptions of the control that others have over their actions are widely acknowledged to be relevant to moral judgments (Wegner, 2003; Nichols and Knobe, 2007; Pizarro and Helzer, 2010; Sarkissian et al, 2010)
Consistent with our predictions, selfreported sense of control was significantly positively associated with moral judgment intensity (M = 2.83, SD = 0.66) across the judgments in this study (b = 0.16, SE = 0.05, z = 3.15, p = 0.002, 95% CI = [0.060, 0.259]
This study provided preliminary evidence that individuals who experience a greater sense of personal control provide more intense moral judgments of others
Summary
Perceptions of the control that others have over their actions are widely acknowledged to be relevant to moral judgments (Wegner, 2003; Nichols and Knobe, 2007; Pizarro and Helzer, 2010; Sarkissian et al, 2010). When making judgments of others, individuals take into account the degree to which moral actors intend to perform the actions being judged (Pizarro et al, 2003a) and the degree to which they can be held responsible for performing those actions (Gray and Wegner, 2009). Individuals appear to take into consideration the perceived responsibility that an actor has regarding his or her action. What these studies have in common is that they investigate the degree to which the perceived control of the actor over his or her action influences observers’ judgments of that actor’s action. We argue that another individual difference contributes to the moral judgment process: differences in one’s current sense of control over one’s own actions
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
