SENSE OF AGENCY DOES NOT SUPPORT ANTI-REDUCTIONIST THEORIES OF ACTION

Beatriz Sorrentino Marques

doi:10.1590/0100-512x2021n14905bsm

Abstract

ABSTRACT Anti-reductionist Theories of Action are, in general, accounts of action according to which the role the agent plays in the production of her action cannot be reduced to her mental events or states. Proponents of these theories present claims according to which Anti-reductionist Theories of Action better capture the sense of agency that agents experience when performing intentional actions than the competing Causal Theory of Action. I will investigate the arguments supporting these claims and argue that they do not survive scrutiny, especially when taking into consideration the neuro-cognitive information available about the sense of agency. Anti-reductionist Theories of Action seem incompatible with the empirical account of sense of agency, as show experiments focusing on action selection, the comparator model, and perception of the relation between action and its outcome. Alternatively, the Causal Theory of Action is more able to accommodate and explain the sense of agency.

Highlights

The sense of agency the agent experiences when she performs an intentional action has become a point of interest for both neuroscience and philosophy
Proponents of these theories present claims according to which Anti-reductionist Theories of Action better capture the sense of agency that agents experience when performing intentional actions than the competing Causal Theory of Action
Anti-reductionist Theories of Action seem incompatible with the empirical account of sense of agency, as show experiments focusing on action selection, the comparator model, and perception of the relation between action and its outcome

Summary

Introduction

The sense of agency the agent experiences when she performs an intentional action has become a point of interest for both neuroscience and philosophy. Proponents of Anti-reductionist Theories of Action (Ginet, 1997; Lowe, 2008; Nida-Rümelin, 2007; O’Connor, 1995, 2009; Pereboom, 2015) claim that sense of agency supports their theories. I will investigate this kind of claim. I argue that the scientific account does not support Anti-reductionist Theories of Action (ATA) and that it favors the Causal Theory of Action (CTA). In section five, I respond to possible objections

Sense of agency

The scientific account of sense of agency

The scientific account undermines claims made by ATA

Possible objections

Findings

Conclusion