Semi-liberal constitutionalism

Abstract

Abstract:The article examines the conceptual category of semi-liberal constitutionalism and offers some thoughts on the unique normative challenges that arise in the resolution of human rights conflicts in semi-liberal constitutional systems. Under the definition offered a semi-liberal constitutional system is a system that meets two conditions: first, it exhibits a simultaneous dual normative commitment to liberal rights and principles and to other values or interests that result in enduring and significant restrictions on some of these rights; second, this dual normative commitment is constitutive and is expressed in the basic elements of the system. Describing the problem of shaping and interpreting normative commitments in a semi-liberal constitutional regime, the article argues that an insufficient understanding of semi-liberal normativity may result in skewed reasoning by both courts and policymakers trying to resolve human rights conflicts in semi-liberal constitutional regimes, because the application of liberal rights reasoning in semi-liberal settings neglects the power differentials inherent in such systems and tends to overprotect the rights of some at the expense of the rights of others. Offering Israel as an example of a semi-liberal constitutional system and using one aspect of its semi-liberal nature – the structure of its religion–state relations and specifically of its religious personal laws – the article analyses three decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, pointing to the special difficulties arising in such settings and offering critiques and corrections to the Court’s rulings where applicable.