Semicompatibilism Imperiled

Abstract

AbstractBlameworthiness semicompatibilism is the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral blameworthiness even if incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. Two concerns with this thesis are raised. First, I show why Frankfurt examples, which play a key role in underwriting blameworthiness semicompatibilism, are not as secure as many believe because of conceptual ties between blameworthiness and impermissibility. Second, I argue that if blameworthiness is conceptually associated, even if in a roundabout way with impermissibility, and one cannot do wrong unless one could have done otherwise, blameworthiness semicompatibilism is imperiled. With suitable amendments, parallel problems plague praiseworthiness semicompatibilism, the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral praiseworthiness even if incompatible with freedom to do otherwise.