Semantical Questions in Carnap's Inductive Logic

Abstract

Rudolf Carnap's last writings on the theory of inductive logic are now in the process of publication. Volume I of Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability was issued over four years ago; Volume II is close to being published. It is time to consider once again (as Wesley C. Salmon did in a series of articles in the 1960s) some of the issues raised by this protean philosopher of induction. One could argue that consideration should await the publication of Volume II. But I think there are enough themes of importance in Volume I to warrant inspection and criticism. Much of the work in Volume I is a recapitulation of themes which were present in embryo in the Logical Foundations of Probability and which were developed by Carnap in the post-Foundations period from 1950 until his death. Most of these results were published in a number of papers. In addition to these papers, Carnap provided to a circle of students and associates a great deal of mimeographed materials. The article, 'A Basic System of Inductive Logic, Part I', is an editing of part of this material. Part II of the 'Basic System' will be published in Volume II. The latter contains material on analogical inference which, in my opinion, represents a new departure in Carnap's thinking. Salmon has investigated some of the developments in Carnap's inductive logic, developments which had already become apparent by the middle sixties. But there are themes in Carnap's work to which Salmon did not pay enough attention. I will not presume to offer an extended critique of Carnap's last system. Instead, I shall take my text from a remark which Salmon makes in one of his papers: