Semantic under-determinacy, Content and Context

Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to investigate the topic of semantic under-determinacy, i.e. the failure of the semantic content of certain expressions to determine a truth-evaluable utterance content. In the first part of the thesis, I engage with the problem of setting apart semantic under-determinacy as opposed to other phenomena such as ambiguity, vagueness, indexicality. As I will argue, the feature that distinguishes semantic under-determinacy from these phenomena is its being explainable solely in terms of under-articulation. In the second part of the thesis, I discuss the topic of how communication is possible, despite the semantic under-determinacy of language. I discuss a number of answers that have been offered: (i) the Radical Contextualist explanation which emphasises the role of pragmatic processes in utterance comprehension; (ii) the Indexicalist explanation in terms of hidden syntactic positions; (iii) the Relativist account, which regards sentences as true or false relative to extra coordinates in the circumstances of evaluation (besides possible worlds). In the final chapter, I propose an account of the comprehension of utterances of semantically under-determined sentences in terms of conceptual constraints, i.e. ways of organising information which regulate thought and discourse on certain matters. Conceptual constraints help the hearer to work out the truth-conditions of an utterance of a semantically under-determined sentence. Their role is clearly semantic, in that they contribute to “what is said” (rather than to “what is implied”); however, they do not respond to any syntactic constraint. The view I propose therefore differs, on the one hand, from Radical Contextualism, because it stresses the role of semantic-governed processes as opposed to pragmatics-governed processes; on the other hand, it differs from Indexicalism in its not endorsing any commitment as to hidden syntactic positions; and it differs from Relativism in that it maintains a monadic notion if truth.