Semantic priming supports infants' ability to learn names of unseen objects.

Elena Luchkina,Sandra R. Waxman,Lucas Payne Butler

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0244968

Abstract

Human language permits us to call to mind objects, events, and ideas that we cannot witness directly. This capacity rests upon abstract verbal reference: the appreciation that words are linked to mental representations that can be established, retrieved and modified, even when the entities to which a word refers is perceptually unavailable. Although establishing verbal reference is a pivotal achievement, questions concerning its developmental origins remain. To address this gap, we investigate infants' ability to establish a representation of an object, hidden from view, from language input alone. In two experiments, 15-month-olds (N = 72) and 12-month-olds (N = 72) watch as an actor names three familiar, visible objects; she then provides a novel name for a fourth, hidden fully from infants' view. In the Semantic Priming condition, the visible familiar objects all belong to the same semantic neighborhood (e.g., apple, banana, orange). In the No Priming condition, the objects are drawn from different semantic neighborhoods (e.g., apple, shoe, car). At test infants view two objects. If infants can use the naming information alone to identify the likely referent, then infants in the Semantic Priming, but not in the No Priming condition, will successfully infer the referent of the fourth (hidden) object. Brief summary of results here. Implications for the development of abstract verbal reference will be discussed.

Highlights

Language is among our most powerful tools for learning and communication
This capacity rests upon an appreciation that language can convey information that is decoupled from the here-and-. This uniquely human power is enabled by abstract verbal reference–an appreciation that words are linked to mental representations that can be established, retrieved and modified, even when the entities to which they refer are not perceptually available [2,3,4]
We propose that if infants can establish a mental representation for the meaning of a novel word from language alone and later draw on that representation to identify a candidate referent of that novel word, this will constitute clear evidence for abstract verbal reference

Summary

Introduction

Language is among our most powerful tools for learning and communication. It permits us to learn information that does not, or cannot, manifest perceptually at the time of learning [1], such as historic facts, hypothetical scenarios, or scientific constructs. From toddlers hearing words for absent and often unknown objects (e.g., “Daddy outside is fixing the trellis”) to physicists conversing about gravity, the communicative power of language enables us to transmit new information across space and time. This capacity rests upon an appreciation that language can convey information that is decoupled from the here-and-now. This capacity rests upon an appreciation that language can convey information that is decoupled from the here-and- This uniquely human power is enabled by abstract verbal reference–an appreciation that words are linked to mental representations that can be established, retrieved and modified, even when the entities to which they refer are not perceptually available [2,3,4].

Objectives

Methods

Results