Abstract

Dual-process models suggest that recognition memory is independently supported by recollection and familiarity. Current theories attribute recollection solely to hippocampally mediated episodic memory (EM), and familiarity to both episodic and semantic memory (SM) supported by medial temporal lobe cortex (MTLC) and prefrontal cortex. We tested whether, contrary to this view, recollection-like processes also intrinsically support SM recognition and whether MTL structures are involved in their execution. A semantic Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP) with famous and non-famous names was used in three experiments. Experiment 1 revealed that recollection-like processes in semantic memory were not associated with episodic memory for the public events, were predicted by performance on standard SM tasks and were independent of EM tasks, suggesting they are intrinsic to SM. Experiment 2 demonstrated the independence of the two process estimates by showing only familiarity was affected by shifting response criterion while only recollection estimates were significantly altered under divided-attention. Finally experiment 3 tested amnesic patients with varying degrees of hippocampal and MTLC damage. Despite normal overall fame recognition performance, recollection estimates were specifically affected by MTL damage. When damage was primarily hippocampal, only retrograde recollection estimates were reduced, while more extensive MTLC damage led to both retrograde and anterograde recollection deficits. We conclude that recognition of semantic information is supported by at least two independent processes akin to the ones that support EM recognition. Recollection-like processes are intrinsic to SM and likely do not reflect EM contribution to SM performance. Together with previous studies of recollection in remote memory, these data suggest that recollection is not a unitary phenomenon. In EM it involves autonoetic re-experiencing, and is supported by interaction of fronto-temporal networks; in EM and SM it supports retrieval of contextual/associative information regardless of consciousness type, and is dependent on intact MTL function. Familiarity processes and neural substrates may also differ between lifetime familiarity and within-session familiarity.

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