Abstract
In a first-price sealed-bid discriminatory auction with M winners, the surplus gained by the seller from constant relative and constant absolute risk-averse bidders is defined. For sufficiently high risk aversion in these cases, the seller gains all the surplus. It is also shown that constant relative risk-averse bidders are equivalent to risk-neutral bidders with a transformed distribution of private values.
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