Self-representationalism and the explanatory gap

Abstract

According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self-representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. Part of the motivation for this view is a conception of phenomenal consciousness as involving essentially a subtle, primordial kind of self-consciousness. A consequence of this conception is that the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties is eo ipso an explanatory gap between (the relevant kind of) self-consciousness and physical properties. In this paper, I consider how selfrepresentationalism might address this explanatory gap. I open with a presentation of self-representationalism and the motivation for it (§1). After introducing the explanatory gap, and suggesting that on self-representationalism it would apply to self-consciousness (§2), I present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap (§3). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to selfrepresentationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection (§4). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection (§5).