Self-reference and self-awareness

Abstract

Abstract If we consider the logical powers of first-person statements and the role played by the first-person pronoun in communication, nothing seems clearer than that in all first-person statements, including “avowals,” the word ‘I’ functions as a singular term or singular referring expression. Statements expressed by the sentence “I feel pain” have it in common with those expressed by sentences like “He feels pain” and “Jones feels pain” that they contradict the proposition “Nobody feels pain” and entail the proposition “Someone feels pain.” In these and other ways “I feel pain” behaves logically as a value of the propositional function “X feels pain.” Moreover, in all first-person statements, including “psychological” or “experience” statements, the word ‘I’ serves the function of identifying for the audience the subject to which the predicate of the statement must apply if the statement is to be true (what it indicates, of course, is that the subject is the speaker, the maker of the statement). And this is precisely the function of a referring expression.