Abstract

Various operational communication models are using Delay-Tolerant Network as a communication tool in recent times. In such a communication paradigm, sometimes there are disconnections and interferences as well as high delays like vehicle Ad hoc networks (VANETs). A new research mechanism, namely, the vehicle Delay-tolerant network (VDTN), is introduced due to several similar characteristics. The store-carry-forward mechanism in VDTNs is beneficial in forwarding the messages to the destination without end-to-end connectivity. To accomplish this task, the cooperation of nodes is needed to forward messages to the destination. However, we cannot be sure that all the nodes in the network will cooperate and contribute their computing resources for message forwarding without any reward. Furthermore, there are some selfish nodes in the network which may not cooperate to forward the messages, and are inclined to increase their own resources. This is one of the major challenges in VDTNs and incentive mechanisms are used as a major solution. This paper presents a detailed study of the recently proposed incentive schemes for VDTNs. This paper also gives some open challenges and future directions for interested researchers in the future.

Highlights

  • The internet has modernized the communication of people connected with one another

  • The selfish behavior of nodes is a major challenge in vehicle Delay-tolerant network (VDTN) where the nodes do not take responsibility to forward the messages to save its resources, such as computational power, memory, etc

  • Various incentive schemes are proposed to address the issue of selfishness in the VDTNs to improve its performance

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Summary

Introduction

The internet has modernized the communication of people connected with one another. still, we find certain scenarios where the internet infrastructure is not available for communication.Some of these areas are disaster zones, big events like sports and other festivals, and areas where the internet is either too expensive or even not available. Other networks like packet switched networks [36], some of the connected nodes are not willing to forward packets to their neighbor nodes. These nodes are selfish and only use other nodes for their own interest and purpose. [41], the selfish behavior of nodes in the network has been classified into two categories: collusion and non-cooperation as shown in Figure 2 The collusion level of selfishness is either social selfishness or individual selfishness [42,43]. Social Selfish nodes improve their cooperation with other nodes in a network based on the social relationship to increase their social value. Incentive-based mechanisms are used to manage the selfish behavior of the nodes in a network

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