Self-identity and Moral Agency

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to investigate the contribution self-identity makes to our standing as morally accountable agents. Some of our interest in self-identity, i.e. a sense of self, arises out of concerns of particular importance from the perspective of the person herself. Such matters include the sustained interest we have in our future and in the fact that we anticipate our own behavior in a different way than we anticipate the behavior of others. Yet second-personal concerns are apparent here as well. It is a matter of both first-personal and second-personal concern that we be able to present ourselves as partners in social exchange with others and in the interpersonal enterprise that constitutes moral accountability. Self-identity is foundational for interacting in ways that give expression to our values and concerns. A sense of self enables us to be aware of what we do and to appreciate the motives that lie behind what we do. A sense of self is thus crucial to our status as agents; without a sense of self, we have no reason to place faith in our own agency—in our ability to affect the world through our choices and actions and our position to do so.