Self-determination in political philosophy and international law

Abstract

While nationalism is in origin a European idea, it has spread far beyond the boundaries of Europe in the last century to become a prevalent ideology in all major regions of the world. One indication that this is the case is the increasing extent to which self-determination has become an important problem for the theory and practice of international law. It is the case, however, that selfdetermination has a quite different meaning in international law than it has in contemporary political philosophy. International law posits a principle of Popular Self-Determination (PSD) that applies to cases in which populations of already existing countries lack selfgovernment. In contrast, a number of contemporary political philosophers assert a right of National Self-Determination (NSD) that applies to nationalities without their own independent states. I argue here that the principle of PSD found in international law is philosophically more warranted than the right of NSD claimed by nationalists and current in political philosophy. Self-determination as a political concept dates from the early years of this century, but its origins lie in eighteenthand nineteenth-century philosophy. The idea of self-determination originated as a notion of the freedom of individuals to determine the conditions of their own life. Its later expansion to include the selfdetermination of communities as well as individuals has been characterised as a shift of concern from ‘personhood’ to ‘peoplehood’.’ The political principle of self-determination was first proclaimed by Lenin and Wilson in the aftermath of World War I. Despite the failure of the League of Nations or international jurists to acknowledge this principle in the 1920s and 3Os, such proclamations inaugurated the modern advocacy of self-determination. Some measure of recognition was achieved after World War II by references to self-determination in the United Nations Charter and by the adoption of UN Resolutions 1514 and 2625 in 1960 and 1970. Despite controversy as to whether such documents constitute legitimate sources of international law, they do indicate the growing customary acceptance of some principle of selfdetermination.2 This principle has also been acknowledged in a number of state constitutions and treaties, interstate organisational charters and declarations, and decisions by the World Court. What has been recognised in most of these documents is the right or at least claim of ‘peoples’ to self-determination. Peoples are here understood to be the inhabitants of countries-which may be and usually are