Self-Cultivation According to Li Zhi and Its Paradoxes

Abstract

This essay delves into the significance of self-cultivation in the thought of Li Zhi (1527–1602), particularly the process of rediscovering one’s childlike innocence (tongxin 童心). This journey challenges conventional morals and doctrines due to Li Zhi’s various levels of interpretation, which scrutinize the concept of self and the objectives of self-cultivation. Li Zhi’s notion of the self develops some concepts elaborated within the School of Mind, notably those of Wang Ji (1498–1583), and reconstructs an alternative Chinese model of a self, centered on individual autonomy. His ideas provoke ethical and philosophical considerations from both intra-cultural and transcultural perspectives. Central to Li Zhi’s concept of self-cultivation is based on his psychological realism, which begins with an acknowledgment of the inherent “selfishness” of human nature. However, unlike Xunzi’s viewpoint, Li Zhi contends that this innate selfishness is not the cause of conflicts and disorder. On the contrary, it is the source of morality and a positive dynamic force both in society and in personal life. He harnesses the concept of emptiness inherited from Buddhism and Wang Ji, employing it as a practical and secular tool to liberate individuals from biases, authoritarian dictates, and social norms. Situated within the framework of the cult of qing and the reclamation of emotions and desires, Li Zhi’s notion of the childmind, with its natural inclinations, self-interests, and desires, resonates with modern psychological theories on the flow of consciousness and self-motivation, as well as contemporary discussions on the morality of self-interest. This juxtaposition unveils the paradox of “Unsocial sociability,” prompting an exploration of the intricate relationship between sociability and selfishness. Questions remain, then, concerning the efficacy of self-cultivation in fostering the spontaneous expression of moderate and genuine inclinations. Can such self-cultivation establish a moral standard accessible to all, on their own terms, while simultaneously preventing harm among individuals (bu xianghai 不相害)? These inquiries underscore the complexity inherent in Li Zhi’s philosophy and invite further contemplation on the dynamics of selfhood and ethical conduct.