Self-Awareness as Transcendental Mediationality

Abstract

The theories of self-consciousness that developed within the hermeneutic tradition went largely neglected, seemingly overshadowed by the nascent “logic of the horizon” that appeared over the course of the same movement. However, regardless of this past neglect, Paul Yorck’s theory of self-consciousness is unmistakably worthy of our attention as contemporary scholars. Indeed, current phenomenological debates seem to have once again started producing arguments concerning self-consciousness that resemble Yorck’s theory. To at least some degree, these ideas are commensurate with both the discussions concerning the problem of “the relational structure between ‘reason’ and ‘reason’s other’” that took place in German Idealist philosophy (particularly in Fichte’s later Wissenschaftslehre), as well as to discussions concerning the general problem of the relation between life and knowledge. Yet, the philosopher whose work most strongly resonates with this movement is actually none Nishida Kitaro’s theory of “self-awareness”. In this contribution, we will re-interpret Nishida’s account of self-awareness as a theory capable of penetrating the very core of the problems we find in current philosophical debates. To do this, we will look at the function which allows for the apparent to appear, even as it conceals itself. This function is referred to here as “transcendental mediationality”, and is none other than the “self-differentiation of life” itself. As we shall see in this contribution, in Nishida’s philosophy it is precisely through “becoming one” with this differentiation itself that we are able to give an account of self-awareness.