Self-affection in Kant's Opus postumum and in the Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract

The author picks up an argument from the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant asserts that the conception of ourselves as the enduring subject of our mental life is enough to function as the ground for the possibility of our objective experiences and judgments, even though that is nevertheless insufficient to settle what we as human beings really are. In order to have knowledge about us as human beings and individuals, we need to situate ourselves in the causal order. But, she asks, how is the link between these two kinds of self-conception to be understood? Can they be described as a continuing process of self-determination or are there two different kinds of acts? What role does the practical self-play here? To answer these, the author interprets Kant’s doctrine of self-determination in the Opus postumum. The first part of the paper elucidates the context of the doctrine of self-determination in the Opus postumum. The second part develops what we exactly do according to Kant in the procedure of self-determination described here. The third part deals with the question of how the practical self comes into play.