Self-oriented monetary policy, global financial markets and excess volatility of international capital flows

Abstract

This paper explores the nature of macroeconomic spillovers from advanced economies to emerging market economies (EMEs) and the consequences for independent use of monetary policy in EMEs. We first empirically document that a US contractionary monetary policy shock leads a retrenchment in EME capital flows, a fall in EME GDP, and an exchange rate depreciation. We construct a theoretical model that can help to account for these findings. In the model, macroeconomic spillovers may be exacerbated by financial frictions. Absent financial frictions, international spillovers are minor, and an inflation targeting rule represents an effective policy for the EME. With frictions in financial intermediation, however, spillovers are substantially magnified, and an inflation targeting rule has little advantage over an exchange rate peg. However, an optimal monetary policy markedly improves on the performance of naive inflation targeting or an exchange rate peg. Furthermore, optimal policies don't need to be coordinated across countries. A non-cooperative, self-oriented optimal policy gives results very similar to those of a global cooperative optimal policy.