Self or Selves?

Abstract

Contemporary discussions within the fields of neuroscience (biology), physics and philosophy have provided profound new insights into the architecture of the brain, brain processes and the nature of consciousness. These insights permit the formulation of theoretical models that attempt to describe the organization of the self-system: that is, the way in which knowledge about the self is organized and related with respect to distinct context-related self-representations. During the last decade the issue of `dissociative identity disorder' (DID; previously termed `multiple personality disorder' or MPD) has obtained increasingly greater attention within the fields of psychopathology and psychiatry. The arguments outlined in this paper are based on the assumption that dissociative identity disorder is actually an associative identity disorder. It is the result of deficient integrative and associative processes in the self-system or the use of different ego centers instead of one. Because the inaccessibility of the non-integrated parts of the self (i.e. amnesia) is one of the determining characteristics for the diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder, it is argued that this disorder can only manifest itself with individuals showing a high cognitive complexity of organization of self-relevant information. Cognitive complexity of the neurological system may be an endogenous factor affecting the occurrence of associative disorders and in part explain the many instances in which severe childhood abuse (i.e. physical, sexual and! or mental abuse) does not result in any symptoms of failing association.