Self-Interest and the Inefficiency of Elected Executives in Matching the Intensity of a Policy Tool to the Intensity of a Policy Problem: Towards a Theorem

Abstract

Theoretical models of political agency primarily incorporate elected executives’ self-interest as motivating reelection-seeking behavior. A concerning trend of democratic backsliding and the scholarly recognition that dominant political leaders in democratic regimes are increasingly willing to challenge democratic norms, the rule of law, and core institutions in pursuit of their political interest highlight that these models fail to capture variations in the intensity of self-interest motivations and their effects. To bridge this gap conceptually, I focus on elected executives’ efficiency in matching the intensity of policy tools to the intensity of policy problems, thus developing the Ladder of Disproportionate Policy. I tie climbing and descending this ladder to elected executives’ progression between three self-interest constructs with varying levels of self-interest intensity. I explore socio-psychological and political mechanisms that may facilitate this progression and develop the Disproportionate Policy Theorem that can serve as a generator of insights and hypotheses, probing its utility.