Abstract
We consider an infinite horizon game in which players have heterogeneous beliefs about future endowments process and trade with each other. Focusing on Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect equilibria, we find that unlike dynamic general equilibrium models, every player’s consumption is bounded away from zero. That is, every player survives in a Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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