Self-employment, corruption, and property rights: a comparative analysis of European and CEE economies

Abstract

This study analyzes the relationship between self-employment, corruption, and property rights in 30 European countries, including 11 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) economies, across the two decades of 1996–2016. In general, relatively little research has focused on the relationship between entrepreneurship and the protection of property rights. Furthermore, past findings show that corruption may have both negative and positive effects on the level of entrepreneurial activity, either “greasing” or “sanding” the wheels for entrepreneurship. Overall, research on how the informal institution corruption and the formal institution property rights are linked to entrepreneurship in post-socialist/transition economies has been limited. We find that stronger protection of property rights increases self-employment ratios, both in Europe in general and in CEE economies. The relationship between self-employment and the control of corruption is not significant. We conclude that neither higher nor lower levels of corruption control affect the share of self-employment. In comparative perspective, the ratio of self-employment in the group of CEE economies does not respond differently to these two key institutions.