Abstract
Doppelt criticizes my theory of freedom as self‐development and the related model of workers’ self‐management which I propose. I argue that Doppelt ignores or misconstrues three major features of my view: (1) the systematic grounding of the conception of freedom in the nature of agency and the distinction I draw between abstract and concrete freedom; (2) my derivation of rights of self‐management from the concept of freedom; (3) my argument for a universal right of employment. In general, Doppelt's criticism ignores the systematic conception I have offered of equal rights of access to the social and economic conditions of self‐development, a conception which he himself seems to be getting at in his proposed paradigm. I go on to criticize two major features of Doppelt's own view, namely, his historical relativism and his interpretation of meaningful work.
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