Self-Determination and Power-Sharing in Israel/Palestine

Abstract

This article surveys three different concepts of political self-determination that may be applied to the Israel/Palestine conflict, and considers how they may or may not justify power-sharing arrangements of the type suggested by Brendan O’Leary. In addition, the various forms of both two-state and one-state solutions are considered for their congruence with the best understanding of self-determination. The three forms of the self-determination principle are: statist, national, and ecological. The author argues that only the last is justifiable as the basis for a settlement of the conflict, as well as more generally for twenty-first century conflicts over resources and territory. In theory, ecological self-determination would justify a one-state solution that would unify the region in order to maintain its resources sustainably. But both solutions face myriad political obstacles. The author discusses the difference between consociation and federation, two theories of power-sharing, both with disadvantages, and concludes that O’Leary has suggested an interesting approach that focuses not on the end-state solution, but on intermediate proposals to begin the process of cooperation. The author concludes by maintaining that the main obstacles are neither philosophical nor policy-oriented, but political, and suggests some reasons for cautious optimism in that regard.