Abstract
I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.
Highlights
A growing army of theorists have struck out in attack mode against the notion of a pre-reflective, minimal sense of self or sense of ownership (e.g., Dainton, 2008, 2016; Bermúdez, 2011, in press; Prinz, 2012; Di Francesco et al, 2016; Garfield, 2016)
I’ll use the power of the critics’ own arguments against them by showing (1) that the pre-reflective sense of ownership is, on the phenomenological accounts that are criticized, intrinsic to experience, rather than some additional quality, and this is just what the deflationary account requires; (2) that the concept of a pre-reflective sense of ownership is consistent with the empirical evidence that the critics themselves cite; and (3) that a more positive account of the sense of ownership is to be found in the phenomenologically inspired enactivist view of experience as always embodied and most often agentive
We find the phrase ‘sense of ownership’ in use at least from the mid1990s, for example in Martin (1995), who defines it as “the phenomenological quality that [a] body part appears to be part of one’s body” (Martin, 1995, p. 269; see Martin, 1992)
Summary
A growing army of theorists have struck out in attack mode against the notion of a pre-reflective, minimal sense of self or sense of ownership (e.g., Dainton, 2008, 2016; Bermúdez, 2011, in press; Prinz, 2012; Di Francesco et al, 2016; Garfield, 2016) To defend against such attacks I’ll follow a divide and conquer strategy. Self-defense of legal ownership of one’s body may be appropriate, in the context that we are considering here, which involves a phenomenological conception, this would be a misunderstanding In this context, we find the phrase ‘sense of ownership’ in use at least from the mid1990s, for example in Martin (1995), who defines it as “the phenomenological quality that [a] body part appears to be part of one’s body” The phenomenological view is that SO/mineness is experienced in the pre-reflective (or non-reflective) selfawareness that is intrinsic in everyday (non-pathological, nonexceptional) conscious experience. It is important to distinguish this first-order, pre-reflective SO from a retrospective (reflective) judgment about ownership (Vosgerau and Newen, 2007)
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