Self-deception in Second-rate English

Abstract

In 'Deceptions? Assertions? Or Second-String Verbiage?' (Philosophy 56, No 215 (January i98i) 100-105) John King-Farlow challenges the correctness of two claims made by me in my 'Self-deception: A Reflexive Dilemma' (Philosophy 52, No 20I (July I977) 28I-299). His first charge is that I waste my time in pressing a distinction between merely deceiving oneself and self-deception proper, in view of the fact that the distinction would not normally be preserved in second-rate, off-colour English, 'second-string verbiage' as King-Farlow has it. King-Farlow's second complaint against me is that I myself am guilty of 'second-string verbiage' in my frequent and unapologetic use of the locution deceive that, which casts doubt on the soundness of the above distinction and on my own feeling for English and suggests that, as one who is himself quite happy to rely on 'second-string verbiage', I am in no position to chide others. Indeed, says King-Farlow, a kind of cultural collapse has rendered 'second-string verbiage' so widespread that a philosopher has a duty to acknowledge its existence, to work from within it if necessary, and not to draw puristic linguistic distinctions which are not recognized in it. How do I answer these charges? To the first charge my reply is that there is no case to answer and to the second I plead 'Not Guilty'. I begin with the first charge. King-Farlow correctly notes that in my article I argued that it is possible to deceive oneself without automatically falling into self-deception. I further suggested that what converts deceiving oneself into self-deception proper is the added ingredient of dishonesty with oneself. In support of this claim I constructed, amongst others, an example of an unfortunate military camouflage expert who ended up having deceived everyone, including himself, as to the whereabouts of a gun which he himself had camouflaged. It would, I hoped, seem ludicrous to attribute the state of self-deception to the hapless expert who had none the less deceived himself. King-Farlow points out, correctly to my mind, that this subtle distinction, this refusal to use the noun-phrase 'selfdeception' and some part of the verbal phrase 'to deceive oneself' interchangeably, would not be observed in everyday speech. Agreed. But how telling is this objection? The difference that J. L. Austin once brought out between 'by accident' and 'by mistake' in his tale of two donkeys in his 'A Plea for Excuses' is, I am prepared to believe, not observed in the courts of law or the insurance world and certainly not in everyday excuse-making