Abstract
This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel philosophical account of self-deception. The account offered is independently plausible and avoids the main problems that plague other views. It also yields the result that some delusional subjects are self-deceived. The conclusion is not, however, that those subjects are blameworthy. Rather, a distinction is made between blameworthiness and ‘attributability’. States or actions can be significantly attributable to a subject—in the sense that they are expressions of their wills—without it being the case that the subject is blameworthy, if the subject has an appropriate excuse. Understanding delusions within this framework of responsibility and excuses not only illuminates the ways in which the processes of delusional belief formation and maintenance are continuous with ‘ordinary’ processes of belief formation and maintenance, it also provides a way of understanding the innocence of the delusional subject that does not involve the denial of agency.
Highlights
In this paper I intend to raise a somewhat uncomfortable question: are at least some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? The question strikes us as uncomfortable at least in part because we think the answer is just pretty clearly ‘no’
My argument will be as follows: When we consider the dynamics of a related phenomenon—to wit, self-deception—we will see that there is enough overlap between them to ground the judgment that self-deception is implicated in the formation and maintenance of at least some delusions
My view says: Self-deception as omission: An agent is self-deceived that p if she believes p and intentionally omits to seek, recognize, or appreciate externally available evidence for not-p, for reasons which relate to her desire that p be true, in a way which enables the maintenance of the belief that p
Summary
In this paper I intend to raise a somewhat uncomfortable question: are at least some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? The question strikes us as uncomfortable at least in part because we think the answer is just pretty clearly ‘no’. My view says: Self-deception as omission: An agent is self-deceived that p if she believes p and intentionally omits to seek, recognize, or appreciate externally available evidence for not-p, for reasons which relate to her desire that p be true, in a way which enables the maintenance of the belief that p.4. As we are imagining him, A is engaged in a kind of fantasy which serves an important psychological function for him (though he is almost certainly unaware of it), and it reflects, on account of the motivation which my account attributes to him, his desire that things be a certain way, a way which they manifestly are not, and from which he has insulated himself He is the owner of his self-deceptive omission(s), he does manifest his will in the process, and, importantly, he discloses himself and is an appropriate target for aretaic assessment. To get an idea for the variety of possible contents for delusions, here are some examples of (types of) delusions, individuated by their content:
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
