Self-deception as omission

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue against three leading accounts of self-deception and propose a heretofore overlooked route to self-deception. The central problem with extant accounts is that they are unable to balance two crucial desiderata: (a) to make the dynamics of self-deception (e.g., the formation of self-deceptive beliefs) psychologically plausible, and (b) to capture self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which the self-deceiver is responsible. I argue that the three leading views all fail on one or both counts. However, I claim that many or most cases of self-deception conform to a different model, which I call ‘self-deception as omission.’ In these cases, the process of self-deceptive belief formation and the intentional act for which the self-deceiver is responsible come apart, allowing us to meet both desiderata. Self-deceptive beliefs are often formed by unconscious mechanisms closely analogous to “System 1” processes of dual-systems psychology, or by other mechanisms of motivated reasoning. The nascently self-deceptive subject then acquiesces in the comforting belief and commits an epistemic failure by allowing it to persist. If this is done for motivationally biased reasons – for example, preferring that the belief in question be true – then the subject is self-deceived and is blameworthy for her epistemic omission.