Self‐Deception and Blameworthiness

Abstract

I argue for the view that whether acting from self-deception forthrightly excuses from blameworthiness, in a manner analogous to the manner in which germane ignorance in cases without self-deception forthrightly excuses, depends fundamentally upon the belief states of the self-deceived agents. What the germane belief states of such agents could be, in turn, is a pivotal function of the nature of self-deception. In addition, I defend the view that the conceptually coherent phenomenon of presumably non-typical self-deception in which the self-deceiver has beliefs whose propositional contents are mutually contradictory, calls into question the popular view that moral blameworthiness requires that one have done something morally wrong, and that moral praiseworthiness requires that one have done something morally obligatory or permissible.