Self-Contradictions of the Will: Reply to Jens Timmermann

Pauline Kleingeld

doi:10.1515/kant-2021-0032

Abstract

Abstract In this article, I reply to Jens Timmermann’s critical discussion of my essay “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”. I first consider Timmermann’s reasons for rejecting my interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law. I argue that the self-contradiction relevant to determining a maxim’s moral status should not be sought in the imagined world in which the maxim is a universal law. I then discuss Timmermann’s suggestion that something like a volitional self-contradiction is found within the will of the immoral agent. I deny this and clarify that the relevant contradiction is diagnosed counterfactually in moral reflection. Finally, I explain the differences between Timmermann’s account, Korsgaard’s Practical Contradiction interpretation, and my own Volitional Self-Contradiction interpretation.

Highlights

I reply to Jens Timmermann’s comments on my essay “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”, both published in this journal (Kleingeld 2017; Timmermann 2018)
Uating maxims you have already adopted, say after receiving moral criticism. Nor does his argument rule out testing maxims attributed to others or maxims developed merely as a philosophical exercise, to see what follows from the Categorical Imperative – as Kant’s own examples illustrate
If it is impossible to will to act on a tested maxim and simultaneously to will that it become a universal law – that is, if the maxim generates a volitional self-contradiction when submitted to the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) test – acting on the maxim is morally impermissible

Summary

Introduction

I reply to Jens Timmermann’s comments on my essay “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”, both published in this journal (Kleingeld 2017; Timmermann 2018). In moral reflection, you find that this would yield a contradiction, this contradiction is ‘found’ counterfactually – as Kant’s subjunctives in the examples he discusses indicate He writes that in some cases it is impossible simultaneously to will that the tested maxim become a universal law, for this would mean that your will “would be in conflict with itself” [würde sich selbst widerstreiten] (GMS, AA 04: 423). Uating maxims you have already adopted, say after receiving moral criticism (or after reading the Groundwork, for that matter) Nor does his argument rule out testing maxims attributed to others or maxims developed merely as a philosophical exercise, to see what follows from the Categorical Imperative – as Kant’s own examples illustrate

T he will of the immoral agent

Practical contradictions and self-contradictions of the will