Self-awareness and other-awareness: Mirror self-recognition and synchronic imitation among unfamiliar peers.

Abstract

A theoretical analysis of the cognitive capacities underlying self-awareness and other-awareness suggested that (a) self- and other-awareness are closely linked because both require a cognitive capacity for secondary representation, and (b) other-awareness facilitates the synchronic imitation of object use with an unfamiliar peer. The relation between mirror self-recognition and synchronic imitation was investigated in 56 dyads of unfamiliar 19-month-old children who were systematically paired according to their mirror self-recognition status and who were observed during free play with sets of duplicate toys. Long phases of synchronic imitation occurred in nearly all dyads consisting of recognizers but in only one dyad composed of nonrecognizers; in mixed dyads these phases were shorter than in recognizer dyads. Discussion focuses on the synchrony of the development of self- and other-awareness. During the second year of life, children's social-cognitive competence shows a dramatic increase. Kagan (1981) has described many of these changes, for example, becoming concerned with parental standards for behavior, developing a sense of one's effectiveness in solving a task, and beginning to appreciate the difference between pretense and reality. According to Kagan (1981), these changes indicate the onset of self-awareness: Children become able to evaluate their appearance and actions in terms of their own and others' standards. From another perspective, the social-cognitive changes during the second year also reflect the onset of other-awareness: Children become aware of others' intentions, motivations, and emotions, and they become increasingly able to use this information in social interaction. Self-awareness is a cognitive capacity that marks a specific step in self-development. In recent years, different sequences have been proposed for the development of the self during the first 2 years of life (e.g., Emde, 1983; Lewis, 1986,1990; Stern, 1985). Despite some differences in their definitions of the developmental levels, these authors agree that a critical step is reached when children become able to represent themselves as an object of knowledge and imagination (the representational self, Emde, 1983; the categorical self, Lewis, 1986; and the ver