Self- and Mutual Respect: Beyond Abstraction and Social Humiliation

Abstract

This article offers a look at self- and mutual respect – key concepts of the text – from the perspective of political philosophy, and attempts to show their significance in guaranteeing a decent life in contemporary society. The attempt begins with the experience of social humiliation in Belarus, quite widespread for numerous groups of people. According to John Rawls, it is precisely self- and mutual respect that are meant to reveal the social unacceptability of this experience, which runs counter to the idea of justice. In connection to this, Rawls specifies the concepts of self- and mutual respect, stressing their cognitive and volitional dimensions, as well as what types of human associations support them. By contrast, contemporary American philosopher Martha Nussbaum demonstrates that self- and mutual respect in Rawls are subordinated to the economic efficiency of social cooperation – the true criterion of a just social order, according to Rawls. To return self- and mutual respect to their essential place in the concept of justice (which directly affects the relationship between the idea of justice and the goal of assuring a decent life), Nussbaum offers a wider, somatic understanding of rationality, self and social cohesion. This interpretation also deepens the understanding of justice, connecting the contractual concept of justice with the inclusive one. According to contemporary French political theorist Pierre Rosanvallon, this renewed reading of self- and mutual respect, and thus of justice, affects the concept and justification of the notion of democracy. For this reason, we can supplement the just rules of democracy with attention to the peculiar nature of social humiliation and the privations experienced by people. In my opinion, this discussion is fundamental for post-Soviet countries like Belarus, where social humiliation is the norm, and as such, is not perceived as an obstacle to the democratization of civil society.