Abstract
Recent theory suggests that organizations are selective in the rules they violate. However, theory of selective rule violations is currently bounded to formal, externally governed rules (i.e., laws and directives). This paper expands the boundary conditions of theory of selective rule violations to norms and standards as well as to formal rules by adopting institutional theory. The model offers a more robust and flexible explanation of selective organizational deviance. This paper demonstrates the viability of the conceptual model by exploring information poaching in interorganizational relationships. The model suggests that isomorphism may be selective by positing that perceived risk and focus of attention mediate the effect of isomorphic pressures on isomorphic behavior. Additionally, the model identifies organizational and interorganizational factors that affect selective violations of rules, norms, and standards.
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