Abstract
Abstract Anew form of argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism has recently become prevalent. Carl Ginet, James Lamb, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins have all mounted attacks on compatibilism which take inspiration from the fact that nothing can now be done about events in the (remote) past. Unlike older discussions that seem to hinge on the assumption of universal causation alone, these new arguments do not make the mistake of assuming that, since all actions in a deterministic universe are necessitated by past events taken together with (necessary) laws of nature, all our actions are themselves necessary (inevitable, unavoidable) if determinism is true.
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