Abstract
This chapter presents the revised and successful causal argument for sense-data, which is a combination of the original causal argument and the argument from hallucination. It presents two propositions which together entail that perceptual processes in the brain produce some object of awareness which cannot be identified with any feature of the external world—an object of awareness referred to as a sense-datum. The two propositions are as follows: (1) It is theoretically possible by activating some brain process that is involved in a particular type of perception to cause a hallucination exactly resembling that perception in its subjective character; and (2) It is necessary to give the same account of both hallucinating and perceptual experience when they have the same neural cause.
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