Selection of security system design via games of imperfect information and multi-objective genetic algorithm

Abstract

This work analyzes the strategic interaction between a defender and an intelligent attacker by means of a game and reliability framework involving a multi-objective approach and imperfect information so as to support decision-makers in choosing efficiently designed security systems. A multi-objective genetic algorithm is used to determine the optimal security system's configurations representing the tradeoff between the probability of a successful defense and the acquisition and operational costs. Games with imperfect information are considered, in which the attacker has limited knowledge about the actual security system. The types of security alternatives are readily observable, but the number of redundancies actually implemented in each security subsystem is not known. The proposed methodology is applied to an illustrative example considering power transmission lines in the Northeast of Brazil, which are often targets for attackers who aims at selling the aluminum conductors. The empirical results show that the framework succeeds in handling this sort of strategic interaction.