Selecting Judges

Abstract

Abstract Because judges make influential decisions, understanding how they are selected is paramount. This chapter documents variations in judicial selection worldwide, specifically focusing on how different selection rules allow political and other societal actors to impact the selection process, which could provide such actors with an additional veto point in policy-making. The chapter reviews and categorizes general and specific types of selection mechanisms for 218 constitutional and supreme courts, finding substantial variation in the extent to which certain political actors dominate the process. While a large number of constitutional courts reviewed use a mixed selection mechanism, whereby different political actors choose a specific number of judges, selection dominated by a judicial council or commission is more prevalent for Supreme Courts. However, while it is assumed that judges selected by political actors will favour their selectors in their decisions, the exact design of the selection mechanism as well as the composition of the court and the political context within which it makes decisions may attenuate this expectation. Additional rules and norms related to judicial selection also may influence gender, ethnic, and professional diversity on the court as well as diversity of judicial ideologies or biases. Selection rules viewed in conjunction with other institutional rules and informal practices may undermine the intended effect of selection. The chapter highlights how different selection rules and informal practices influence judicial independence and behaviour and have the potential to allow either for political manipulation or the creation of diverse forums for decision-making.