Abstract
The overthrow of the duly elected government of Fiji in May 2000 illustrates some of the problems of establishing democratic institutions in deeply divided states. In part, while the Fiji case suggests the need for consensus political systems of powersharing requiring special kinds of institutional arrangements which deviate from standard Western zero‐sum adversarial parliamentary models, it points to its limitations in an inflamed communal society. The 1997 constitution incorporated several consensus mechanisms and institutions that attempted to contain the centripetal forces of division and restore stability. However, it was erected on a society that was still deeply at odds with itself. The promise of the 1997 Constitution was located on a minefield of unresolved underlying problems.
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