Seizing the State under International Administration

Abstract

State capture is a form of institutionalized particularism whereby elite actors manipulate policy formation to their own material and political interests at the expense of the public good. In Kosovo, a competitive form of state capture emerged during the postwar period as the country’s main political parties fiercely compete for control over state spoils. What makes the case of state capture in Kosovo stand apart from most countries in the region is the extensive international dimension of Kosovo’s state-building process. This raises an important question: given the extraordinary levels of international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and the strengthening of state institutions, how has corruption become increasingly pervasive in Kosovo under international administration and supervision? The central argument of this article is that the stability paradigm has driven certain international policies and practices that have created conditions favorable to state capture, which indirectly contributes to widespread corruption in Kosovo. The West’s choice of stability and security over democracy and rule of law will have long-term and adverse consequences for Kosovo’s state formation.