Abstract

gain a better understanding of this too-little studied area ofOregon. Thomas R. Cox Emeritus, San Diego State University SEIZINGDESTINY:HOWAMERICA GREW FROMSEATO SHININGSEA by RichardKluger Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007. Maps, notes, index. 667 pages. $35.00 cloth. It has been some time since an author has attempted such a sweeping narrative of the rapid expansion of theUnited Statesfrom the Revolution to the War of 1898and itsaftermath, including the finagled Panamanian Revolu tion,which, as theyalways did along thepath ofManifest Destiny, American promoters promised would bring theblessings of liberty to local inhabitants who now came under their protection. Historical trends for some timehave leaned away from Richard Kluger's approach,with itsemphasis on the individuals who manipulated foreign statesmen toyield to Washington D.C.'s desires. Still,thisisnot "Great Man" history in the sense ofMount Rushmore. The author's sketchesofAmerican leaders and theiropportunities arematched with equally well-accomplished portraits of foreign leaders and theirdifficulties.He is familiarwith, and uses awide range of, secondary sources inwhat must inevitablybe awork of synthesis.For the most part, he provides a near seamless narrative, if one that, on occasion, becomes a bit over ladenwith detail forthe average reader. Kluger sees the storyofAmerican expan sion as a nation filledwith land-hungry set tlers, who, while theypreached thevirtues of the hardy yeomen class toNative Americans (as Jefferson did before concluding they were incapable of absorbing the lesson, and turned to removal as theonly solution), failed to follow the most elementaryrulesof successfulfarming as practiced in Europe. In a sense, of course, the attitudewas: Why should we?With all the land stretchingout across the continent, it was easier toadd new territorythan toworry about depleting the soil with one-crop agriculture and by allowing fields to lie fallow.A related issue pertained to the cost of good farmlands. The political systemwould onlywork ifcost could be held down. In a somewhat oblique fashion, therefore,Kluger invokes Frederick JacksonTurner's thesis as an explanation for theway American democracy worked in the nineteenth century. Ruminating about his deal with Napoleon to secure the Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson wrote years laterthathe had been among those who believed that great sizewas not compat iblewith a democratic system. But now, he wrote, "who can limit the extent towhich the federative principle may operate effectively? The largerour association, the lesswill itbe shaken by local passions" (p. 296). More ter ritory, observes Kluger, seemed to guarantee a safer nation and a more stable government. A special bonus about thepurchase, accordingly, offered the president the ability to reconcile his lost faith in acculturation of the native Americans, with a place to send them, "where theycould persist intheirStoneAge benighted ness" (p. 297). By the time of the Mexican War, thenation had completely convinced itselfof the righteousness of itscause, and presidents such as JamesK. Polk often found themselves trailingpopular opinion. BrooklynEagle editor Walt Whitman railed, "Yes:Mexico must be thoroughly chastised." The timehad come for the world to realize that"Americaknows how to crush ... as well as how to expand" (p. 444). Time and time again, however, thenation's destinywas shaped not only by its"go ahead" statesmen, who astounded their European counterparts with their audacity and energy, but also because of favorable circumstances that convinced Old World leaders to get out of theway andmake thebest deal theycould. This was especially true, of course, in terms Reviews 489 of theunfolding of events that led to thefirst great addition, the Louisiana Purchase. Had Napoleon not foundhis forcesbogged down in Haiti, forexample, howwould he have decided about pursuing an empire in theNew World? James K. Polk and theacquisition ofCalifornia throughwar with Mexico, and tough threats to London over Oregon, offervariations on the theme.Mexico would not back down, but London did. Kluger makes thepoint that the game had been played so successfully since Jefferson thatAmerican presidents grewmore and more emboldened, feeling theirpowers grow as the nation's territorygrew. Polk was perhaps the supreme blufferof thenineteenth century,but in reality,he read the auguries right. His outlandish demand foran expanded Oregon was intended forinternalpolitical con sumption tohold togetheraDemocratic Party already Assuring over thehopeless attempt to balance slaveandfree territory all the way to the Pacific Ocean. The British came around, and Polk had...

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