Abstract

We extend Schelling's segregation model [14] to a flexible social network configuration. Agents belong to two groups: they remove and add relationships when more than half of their neighbors are from the other group. We find that the original segregation gap between the intolerance threshold and the resulting segregation level is maintained in a network setting. When comparing different agents strategies, we find that random behaviors actually lead to more segregated networks than discriminating behaviors, due to the fact that randomness provokes cascades of dissatisfaction. The initial network topology does not seem to affect the results.

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