Seeing Oneself From-the-Outside

Abstract

In “subjective” imagination one views the action from-the-inside, from an internal point of view. In “objective” imagination one views oneself in the imagined scene. Vendler thinks that “objective” imaginings reduce to “subjective” imaginings. And, even though this distinction seems to correspond to field and observer perspectives in episodic memory, Vendler thinks there is no possibility of remembering from-the-outside. This chapter explores the connection between these two claims. Vendler’s reduction entails that the point of view in visual mental imagery is occupied, and that imagery necessarily involves the experience of seeing. And it is this notion of an occupied point of view that fuels Vendler’s skepticism about observer memory. This chapter shows that the point of view in visual imagery can be unoccupied, and imagery need not involve the experience of seeing. Remembering from-the-outside involves an unoccupied point of view and this helps account for the quotidian nature of such memories.