See(k)ing a Strong Leader? How Evolutionary Biases Affect CEO Selection Decisions and the CEO/Board

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Corporate governance scholars have long been interested in understanding boards’ selection of new CEOs and the ongoing Board/CEO relationship, with particular emphasis on how micro- and macro-social factors can shape (and bias) these critical decisions. We extend this research in behavioral corporate governance by advancing a complementary perspective rooted in evolutionary psychology, in which we identify potential biases in board-level decisions vis-à-vis perceptions of CEOs’ physiological features, specifically formidability signals. We first suggest that these evolutionary biases will predict the likelihood of the board’s selection of formidable CEOs, positing that situational conditions, by shifting the perceived cost/benefit trade-offs associated with CEO formidability, will lead boards to be more likely to hire formidable CEOs when threats from interfirm competition are salient, and less likely to hire such CEOs when threats from intrafirm misconduct are salient. We suggest that these evolutionary biases will also affect the board's structuring of the post-selection Board/CEO relationship. Specifically, where boards perceive a congruence between CEO formidability and the situation at hand, we expect a more collaborative Board/CEO relationship, and where boards perceive incongruence, we expect a more control-oriented Board/CEO relationship. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and empirical implications of our perspective for future governance research.