Abstract
Visibly deterring potential adversaries is central to security risk assessment and planning operations within many agencies including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Many visible security elements are employed by TSA toward these goals. Questions remain whether these elements deter/displace attackers, and answers are elusive in these data-poor contexts. Using a novel adversarial exercise with a national sample, our paired conjoint experiment across visibly-changing aviation environments finds the majority of tested security infrastructure visibly deterred simulated adversaries. Canine officer presence deterred, biometric scanners induced, and queue density had no appreciable effect upon target selection. Our findings offer useful criminological insights, clear policy applications, and novel quantitative methods for assessing visible deterrent processes in limited data environments.
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