Security, Terrorism, and Territorial Withdrawal: Critically Reassessing the Lessons of Israel's “Unilateral Disengagement” from the Gaza Strip

Abstract

Abstract In contemporary Israel, the apparently negative consequences of the 2005 “unilateral disengagement” from the Gaza Strip have fueled a perception that leaving territory harms national security. Three claims underlie this framing: (1) domestic Israeli political considerations—not national security concerns—caused the disengagement; (2) Israel abandoned territory without receiving any compensation; and (3) leaving Gaza only precipitated further terrorist attacks. This article challenges these claims. It argues that domestic dynamics alone do not explain the withdrawal. Instead, Israel withdrew to mitigate its casualties, yield foreign policy gains, deter and deny terrorist groups, and avert a perceived demographic threat. The disengagement did not seek to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Instead, through a limited territorial exit, it sought to stabilize the conflict and stymie negotiations with the Palestinians. In contrast to dominant perceptions, Israel achieved all of these objectives. Furthermore, it was Israel's post-disengagement policies that precipitated most of the recent security threats, not the withdrawal itself. These findings reassess the disengagement's goals and efficacy. They demonstrate that in contrast to popular perceptions in Israel today, the Gaza disengagement neither was a strategic blunder nor does it exemplify that territorial withdrawal constitutes a flawed policy choice.