Security Regulation and Enterprise Innovation in Communication Industry

Kai Gao,Lijun Ma,Jian Su

doi:10.1155/2021/3307493

Abstract

This paper conducted an evolutionary game model of the interaction between the governments and communication enterprises and analyzed the impact of the government’s communication security regulation on the innovation decision-making of communication enterprises. The results show that the behavior of the governments depends on the social benefits, rent-seeking benefits, and regulating costs in strict and de security regulations. The communication enterprises’ behavior depends on the benefits of innovation and the costs in R&D and rent-seeking. When government subsidies are relatively inadequate, the communication enterprises’ strategy under government security regulation swings from not-innovation finally to innovation. The policy implications of this study indicate that appropriate de security regulation by the government will help communication enterprises generate a good atmosphere for innovation, and the appropriate increase in subsidies will be more conducive to driving enterprise innovation.

Highlights

Digital technologies and applications, such as artificial intelligence, big data, cloud computing, and 5G, are reshaping human work and life
Fines obtained by the communications company is greater than the sum of the innovation costs it paid and rent-seeking costs under strict security regulation; the additional benefits obtained by the company are less than the innovation costs it paid and the de security regulation and the sum of rentseeking costs (i.e.: Ie + Rs < Δπ + Fg + Pg, Δπ +Fg + Pg < Rd + Fg + Pg + Ie)
The sum of the additional benefits, government subsidies, and government fines obtained by the communications company is greater than the sum of the innovation costs and rent-seeking costs under strict security regulation; the additional benefits obtained by the companies are less than the innovation costs and de security regulation and the sum of rent-seeking costs (i.e., Ie + Rs < Δπ + Fg + Pg, Δπ + Fg + Pg < Rd + Fg + Pg + Ie)

Summary

Introduction

Digital technologies and applications, such as artificial intelligence, big data, cloud computing, and 5G, are reshaping human work and life. In order to answer this question, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government security regulation and enterprise innovation in communication industry. Is research will provide a theoretical basis for enterprise innovation and provide decision-making reference for the government on how to strengthen the security control of the communication industry in the era of big data. E government officials have the opportunity to carry out “bridge charges” in the process of rent-seeking under strict security regulations, increasing capital and time costs of communication enterprises. We assume that the costs of the government’s security regulation under de security regulation and strict security regulation are Cgd and Cgs(Cgs > Cgd), respectively; the government adopts incentive policies such as subsidies, tax incentives, procurement, and other specific measures to support enterprise innovation, which requires the government to spend a high cost. ⎪⎩ y UE − UE􏼁 y(1 − y)􏽨Δπ − Ie − xRd +(1 − x)Fg − (1 − x)Rs +(1 − x)Pg􏽩

Analysis of the Model

Data Simulation and Conclusions

Situation category Situation A

Conclusions